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tAbstract
This paper shows that firms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provide
training to their workers less frequently than firms in other regions and yet seem to
be more in need of it. Utilizing firm level data from the Enterprise Surveys for over
100 countries, it attempts to explain that paradox and also identify alternative policy
actions that MENA countries might use to substantially increase firm-supplied training
by MENA firms. In particular, it points to the potential usefulness of reforms of labor
regulations in MENA countries to be less rigid, but also coupling this with stronger
enforcement so as to encourage existing firms to be more formal and new firms to
enter, grow in size and adopt characteristics more favorable to training over time.
JEL classification: Codes; J41; J58; O15; O53
Keywords: Training; Labor regulations; Enforcement; Middle east; Education-skills
mismatch1 Introduction
This paper shows that countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) stand
out from other regions of the world in several unfortunate, important and interrelated
ways. In general, there is a larger gap between the skills that firms want and those
which young school and university graduates possess in the MENA region than
elsewhere. At the same time MENA countries are experiencing unusually high youth
unemployment rates and unusually long periods of time for school-to-work transitions.
Worker training would seem like a useful solution. But as we show, on the one hand,
the literature on government funded and coordinated training seems to be ineffective
in the region and low in benefits relative to costs, and on the other hand, the incidence
of firm-supplied training is extremely low both in absolute terms and relative to
firms in other regions. This suggests the need for policy reforms to overcome
these shortcomings. For this reason, this paper draws on empirical findings on the
determinants of firm-supplied training to workers in both MENA and Non-MENA
countries to identify some possible reforms that might ameliorate these shortcomings in
MENA countries. We consider programs both to improve the quality of public sector
supplied training programs in MENA countries and to induce both firms to undertake
more training and workers to participate in it.2015 Liaqat and Nugent. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
he original work is properly credited.
Liaqat and Nugent IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:12 Page 2 of 29The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 draws largely on
existing literature to identify these shortcomings in the MENA region with respect
to existing public-sector training programs. It also draws on firm level surveys that
show the incidence of firm-supplied training in the MENA region to be lower than
in any other region despite the demonstrated greater need for such training. It
then identifies the primary objective of this paper, namely, to identify factors that
seem to inhibit the provision of such training by MENA firms relative to that by
firms in Non-MENA countries. Section 3 develops a method for empirically identifying
such factors lying behind the extremely low incidence of firm-supplied training in MENA
countries that overcomes some methodological challenges faced in attempts to do so.
Section 4 identifies the empirical model and data, Section 5 presents the empirical re-
sults and Section 6 derives the implications for policy and future research from the
findings of both this and complementary studies.2 Documentation of the relatively greater need for, but lesser supply of,
firm-supplied training in the MENA region relative to other regions
Three of the most well-documented demographic characteristics of the MENA region
are the relative importance of its youth bulge, the relatively high rate of unemployment
among that youth and its extremely low female labor force participation rate. On the
other hand, it is generally true that both the female labor force participation rate and
population as a whole are growing in MENA over time. This means that in the years
ahead, the challenge of finding employment for MENA youth is only going to be grow-
ing even further over time. Comparative data on each of these three characteristics are
presented in the first three columns of Table 1. In particular, column (1) shows that
MENA countries have a slightly higher share of youths (15–24) than in any other
region except Sub Sahara Africa (SSA); column (2) shows that it has the highest
unemployment rate in this youth group,1 and column (3) that it has the lowest female
labor force participation rate.
Column (4) of Table 1 uses data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (that will
be used extensively in the present analysis) to show that more than 38% of MENA
firms rate the lack of education and skills among their workers to be a “serious or very
serious obstacle to their business”, a rate that is higher than those in the other
(mostly developing) countries included in the Enterprise Surveys.2 Angel-Urdinola
and Leon-Solano (2013, p. 2) define the school-to-work transition as the time it
takes between the age at which 50% of the population has left education and that
at which 50% has found employment and show that it takes more than five years
to make that transition in MENA but less than two years to do so in other regions.
Collectively, therefore, columns (1)-(4) of Table 1 point to the greater seriousness of
the skill gap in the MENA region and its possible link to the region’s high youth
unemployment rate. It is this youth bulge and high youth unemployment rate that
have frequently been pointed to as major contributors to “the Arab Spring” and the
revolutions that have already toppled several governments in the region (Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya and Yemen) and threatened several others.
Columns (5), (6) and (7) of this same table, however, show that, according to these same
surveys, the percentages of both firms which offer such training, and the percentages of
Table 1 Worker, firm and gender characteristics across regions of developing countries
Region % of Population
Aged 15-24
% of Youth (15–24)
who are Unemployed
FLFP % of Firms saying Education And
Skill of Workers is a Serious
Obstacle to their Business











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MENA 20 21 20 38.6 17.7 28.1 15.5 86.9 0.7
EAP 15.5 8 63 25.1 44.61 60 24.9 85.3 3.1
EECA 15 18 46 29.0 32.8 45 30.7 84.6 5.1
LAC 18 17 54 35.9 44.3 58.6 44.8 75.8 4.4
SA 19.6 10 32 15.2 27.9 45.5 55.5 87.8 1.2
SSA 20.9 18 63 24.5 30.1 45.4 28.2 86 3.5
Non-MENA 16.5 14.6 54 23.9 39.3 52.0 37.9 81.0 4.2
All 17.5 12.5 51 26.9 37.7 49.4 35.2 82.7 3.9
Identification of regional designations
MENA Middle East and North Africa; EAP East Asia and the Pacific; EECA Eastern Europe and Central Asia; LAC Latin America and the Caribbean; SA South Asia; SSA Sub-Saharan Africa; Non-MENA All Developing Countries
outside of MENA
Sources of Data (by column)
(1) United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects
(2) International Labor Office Global Employment Trends
(3) Female Labor Force Participation Rate, FLFP, (Females Age 15+), International Labor Office Global Employment Trends
(4) Angel-Urdinola and Leon-Solano 2013, p.3
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regions. Hence, not only does training seem to be in greater need in this region but also it
seems to be less frequently supplied. What makes this training shortfall even more
pervasive and serious is that, because of the relative importance of oil (a depletable
natural resource), and relatively high wage rates (induced by extremely high wage
rates in the public sector funded by oil revenues), training is also needed to facilitate the
kind of structural change needed to maintain competitiveness and employment growth in
the face of globalization and Dutch disease effects of oil.
Two other findings from the literature on MENA that highlight the seriousness of
the skill gap in this region are: (1) the well-recognized growing gap in virtually
every MENA country between the skills possessed by those completing their education
(at increasingly high levels) and those desired by firms (World Bank, 2006), and (2) the
much lower productivity growth between 1991 and 2010 in MENA than elsewhere
(Tzannatos, 2013).
If government-supplied training were both widely available and efficient, it could at
least partially compensate for the shortfall in firm-supplied training. However, the lit-
erature on training in the MENA region makes it clear that, despite considerable efforts
within the region, government-led training has not been successful. Among the more
important and comprehensive surveys of MENA government efforts in training are
World Bank (2004), World Bank (2008), Abrahart et al. (2002), and Angel-Urdinola
et al. (2013). These studies have generally concluded that the government initiated
training programs have imposed significant fiscal costs on governments without yield-
ing positive economic effects, often giving rise to discriminatory selection, and failing
to identify and then deliver the type and quality of training that firms need. Many of
these studies point to the especially poor quality of public sector-provided on-the-job
training (OJT), insufficient involvement of privately run OJT, and excessive concentration
on males. The provision of these public sector training programs is often characterized
as being excessively fragmented across different supplying agencies, leading to dupli-
cation, inefficiency, and lack of coordination. Many of these individual agencies are said
to be woefully under-staffed relative to the number of clients to be served and to
use outdated curricula that are unable to meet the needs of the private sector. Al-
most universally, they are said to be poorly designed and to lack accountability
with respect to results and program evaluation (Angel-Urdinola and Semlali 2010,
Angel-Urdinaola, Semlali and Brodmann 2010, and Angel-Urdinola and Leon-
Solano 2013).
UNESCO (www.unevoc.unesco.org/go.php?q=world+TVE+Database) provides a useful
database covering the technical and vocational education training programs in a number
of MENA countries in recent years (Egypt 2012, Iraq 2014, Lebanon 2012, Oman 2013,
Yemen 2013). These reports identify common problems in these largely government
supplied programs but also some substantial differences in the main constraints
across countries. For example, in Egypt these are said to be the low quality and
deficient remuneration of the teachers; in Iraq, the unstable external environment
and the lack of an adequate strategy framework; in Lebanon, the lack of both close
contact with businesses and their needs, the poor quality of facilities and excessive
centralization of management; in Oman, excessive reliance on non-national trainers; and,
in Yemen, the dearth of qualified teachers.
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much more positive, especially when the workers are reasonably well educated
(Tan and Batra, 1995), as they increasingly are in MENA. We make no claim that
the trainers in firms are better qualified and the programs offered necessarily better
presented than those of publicly provided ones. They do, however, have two
important advantages. They know the needs of firms better and may also be better
able to design them in a way as to be more incentive compatible for both firms
and their workers. For this reason, the paper puts more emphasis on the function-
ing of labor markets and on labor regulations and their enforcement than the
aforementioned studies that focus on the quality of training programs. It will, however,
place needful emphasis on the quality of education in each country and on the
firm-specific assessments of the skill deficiencies in their work force.
Given the firm-specific information on the incidence of firm-supplied training
and on various factors that may explain variations in it across firms and countries
in the MENA region (and for comparison purposes also other developing regions)
available in the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, it is these surveys which we
utilize in this study to identify factors that may explain why firm-supplied training,
despite being seemingly so badly needed in MENA (column (4) of Table 1), is in
fact so seldom offered (column (5) of Table 1). Our approach allows us to improve
on existing studies in dealing with common methodological problems confronting
studies of this sort.
Our findings show that the comparatively low incidence of training in MENA firms
can be attributed to: (1) a combination of relatively rigid labor regulations and low
enforcement (making for large numbers of informal firms and widespread complaints
by formal firms of unfair competition from informal firms), (2) a host of adverse firm
characteristics such as insufficient access to external finance, small size, dearth of new
firms, their lack of technical expertise, and foreign and other corporate ownership, and
(3) lower response rates in the form of training to normal triggers (such as for example,
the firms’ perception of low worker skills). The results also point to differences in the
effects on training between labor regulations on hiring and those on firing. In our
conclusion, we draw on these results to suggest ways in which the existing MENA
shortfall in firm-supplied training may be reduced.3 Method for identifying factors lying behind the lack of firm-supplied
training
Labor markets and the effects of regulations on them have long been recognized as
difficult to analyze. The relationships between employers and workers are subject to
numerous uncertainties and complexities. Since monitoring is costly, informational
asymmetries arise and, as a result, also the possibilities for adverse selection, moral
hazard and market failures. Any such market failures may give rise to the use of labor
regulations to reduce these inefficiencies. But, by no means does it necessarily follow
that the regulations chosen will be optimal and enforced.
A natural starting point is to realize that for privately supplied training to be
sustainable, it has to be profitable to both firms and their workers. In practice,
these both may be buffeted in different directions by different influences, including
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parties will remain together and thereby mutually benefit from training.
One important insight into a successful approach was provided by Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998). They pointed to Germany, where firing costs of regular workers were
comparatively high (which, as we show below, they also are in MENA countries outside
of the Gulf ). German workers found it profitable to engage in apprenticeships with
relatively low wage rates, which made firms able to pay for the training. While their
jobs were not protected at entry or during training (reflecting flexibility in hiring rules),
these apprentices were willing to accept the risks of not being retained because of the
anticipated higher wages after the training. At the same time, firms were willing to pay
for the training because the wages during training were low, and those apprentices who
demonstrated poor abilities during training could easily be dismissed. A problem could
arise for the firms if workers could hold up their employers for higher wages via strikes
(Ahsan and Pages, 2009), but Posusney (1997) and Cammett and Posusney (2010) have
shown that MENA workers have virtually never enjoyed such power.
Even more fundamental analyses of the skill-gap in MENA firms and of their labor
markets are those of Bardak et al. (2006), the World Bank (2010) and Angel-
Urdinola and Leon-Solano (2013, p.3) which traced these problems back to inad-
equacies in labor regulations and their enforcement and firm informality. Outside of the
Gulf at least, de jure labor regulations in the region have generally been characterized as
excessively rigid, and as a result are seldom enforced. As elsewhere, this results in the in-
formality of most private firms, implying that most firms do not abide by existing
regulations on taxation, labor, safety and other matters. But, by being informal, they are
usually deficient in finance, technology and competitiveness, making training rather
useless (Elbadawi and Loayza, 2008). Emigration of better educated workers to Europe
and elsewhere is another contributor to the skills gap in some of the MENA countries
with the best education (World Bank, 2010; Tzannatos, 2013).
The complexities that make it difficult to derive solid conclusions on the impacts of
labor regulations on labor training apply not only to theoretical models but also to
empirical analyses. Problems that challenge empirical investigations include: (1) the
infrequency of changes of labor regulations in any particular country over time, (2)
the possible simultaneity of other accompanying changes, the effects of which may
be difficult to separate out, (3) the fact that almost all such regulations are national
in scope, thereby ruling out the ability to learn from within-country differences,
and (4) the absence of satisfactory measures of regulatory enforcement. Problems
(1) and (2) are a result of the fact that changes in labor regulations typically give
rise to distinct winners and losers, making them politically controversial and
therefore very hard to accomplish (Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent, 2010; Campos
and Nugent, 2012).
Until recently at least, data on labor regulations over time, and firm surveys linking
labor regulations to the incidence of training were both rather rare in developing
countries, limiting most existing studies to developed countries. An especially
relevant study on OECD countries is that of Bassanini et al. (2005), which found a
substantial difference in the correlations between the incidence of job training and
the rigidity of regulations on hiring and those on firing across households over
time in 13 European countries.
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ment in developing countries (where markets are more segmented and regulations less
well-enforced) vary considerably from those in developed countries, generalizations from
the research on developed countries cannot be assumed to apply to developing countries,
to either MENA or other regions.0.1 Some empirical studies on such training in developing countries
Relevant studies on the incidence of training in developing countries include Tan and
Batra (1995), Zeufack (1999), Noor and Ismail (2008), Kahyarara and Teal (2008) and
Almeida and Faria (2014). As to the effects of such training, Betcherman et al. (2004)
report rather traditional evaluations of the effectiveness of various types of training
programs on employment outcomes subject to various kinds of selection bias and
endogeneity. Card et al. (2011) report an evaluation of a program in Dominican Republic
based on randomized experimental design and cite several others using that methodology.
Many of the programs evaluated in this superior way, however, were for special groups,
such as disadvantaged youth, and received rather mixed evaluations. Closer to the present
study is Almeida and Faria (2014), which first estimates the determinants of training
across both firms and their workers in both Malaysia and Thailand and then applies pro-
pensity score matching methods to show that the returns to workers of that training are
positive but vary by worker and industry characteristics.
None of these studies, however, dealt with a MENA country and none related training
to labor regulations in any way. One study that did touch on training in a MENA country
(Tunisia) is Muller and Nordman (2011). These authors identified cases where such
training did take place and showed that this was where wage rates were generally
low during training but higher afterwards, thereby supporting the explanation of
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). Since workers and firms were matched in the Tunisian
study for only a very few firms, however, their evidence is largely anecdotal.
While in most countries labor regulations are determined at the national level
(making it difficult to measure the effects of different regulations), they are not
always equally well enforced throughout the country. For the Dominican Republic,
Schrank (2006) took advantage of a situation where those charged with enforcement also
provided guidance to firms on the objectives of labor regulations, including training. He
showed that the percentages of workers trained were higher in those parts of the country
with more regulators per capita.0.2 Strategies for relating national level labor rigidity indexes to firm level training
To analyze the effects of labor regulations on firm behavior, therefore, one needs access
to detailed internationally comparable indexes of the rigidity of labor regulations,
preferably disaggregated by type of regulation and accompanied by detailed firm surveys
on enforcement of the regulations, firm-supplied training and other firm and institutional
characteristics.
Thanks to the Enterprise Surveys undertaken by the World Bank from 2002 to
present, firm level data on training and the many firm, industry and location-level
characteristics have been collected with almost identical questionnaires, sampling
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countries.
Two rather distinct approaches have been followed in linking labor and other
regulations to firm outcomes including training with this data. The first (the obstacles
approach) is by way of firm-level perceptions of the relative importance of different
regulations and lack of access to certain services as obstacles to doing business.
The second (the enforcement approach) makes use of various proxies for enforcement
of such regulations which may vary within countries (as in the small sample survey
of Schrank, 2006).
Pierre and Scarpetta (2004, 2006) demonstrated the relevance of the obstacles
approach by showing that the rigidity of existing de jure labor regulations was positively
and rather strongly related to the perceptions reported by firms concerning the severity
of labor regulations as an obstacle to their business. Kaplan (2009), Bhaumik et al.
(2012) and Seker (2010) linked these measures to other types of firm performance,
though not to firm-supplied training. Bhaumik and Dimova (2013) found a positive
effect of both training and education on TFP among some firms in textiles in
non-MENA countries but did not examine the determinants of training. One
study that used the obstacles approach with six MENA countries included is
Kinda et al. (2009). That study showed the effects of various “obstacles to business” on
productivity but not on training.
Of particular relevance to the use of the enforcement approach is Almeida and
Aterido (2008) which developed a proxy for locally varying enforcement, again
based on the Enterprise Surveys. The main enforcement measures used were the
numbers of visits by labor or tax inspectors. In their empirical model, they include
both their enforcement measure (visits by inspectors) and in one specification also
its interaction with the country-level rigidity of labor regulations. Their results
show that enforcement by itself has a negative effect on the probability of formal
training but that its interaction with labor law rigidity has a positive and significant
effect. Two possible shortcomings, however, would seem to be (1) that no allowance is
given to a direct effect of labor law rigidity on training (or the firm’s perceived severity
of these regulations as in the “obstacles approach) and (2) the possible endogeneity
or selection bias in their enforcement measure.
These rather mixed results on the relationship between labor regulations and training
from earlier studies based on Enterprise Surveys would seem to leave the door
open for further analysis, and especially so given an earlier finding of very high
returns to training by Almeida and Carneiro (2008). Although the countries in
their sample included a couple of MENA countries, no attempt was made to compare
these or to explain why, as shown in Table 1, training is on average much lower in MENA
countries than in other developing countries.
The enforcement approach in Almeida and Carneiro (2008) was motivated by a study
for Brazil initiated earlier (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009), which was facilitated by rich
administrative information on the allocation of inspectors by municipality. Their focus
on Brazil and on enforcement was motivated in part by that country’s combination
(akin to MENA) of very rigid labor (and other) regulations but overall very limited
(but varying) enforcement and, as a result, a very large informal sector. The Brazilian
study showed that greater enforcement led to lesser reliance on informal workers within a
Liaqat and Nugent IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:12 Page 9 of 29given firm but also to lower levels of productivity, especially when suitable instruments
for enforcement and a 2SLS estimating procedure were used. That study, however, did
not deal with training.
4 The model, data and its estimation
As stated above, in this study we take advantage of the same Enterprise Surveys used
by a few studies reviewed above, though thus far hardly at all for MENA countries,
where (as noted above) firm-supplied training seems most needed but least available.
The Enterprise Surveys provide comparable data for a large number of developing
countries, not only on the characteristics of all firms included in each different country
and year sample, but also on whether or not they provide training to their workers, the
perceived seriousness of the various possible labor regulations and other obstacles to
their business and three different enforcement proxies. These are: the number of visits
by inspectors (the proxy used by Almeida and Carneiro (2008)) specifically for Brazil,
the time spent by management on regulations, and (our preferred measure) a dummy
variable representing consensus by firms in the same location and industry as the firm
that competition from informal firms is either no obstacle or only a minor obstacle.
The surveys employed in this study all utilize a common questionnaire, identical
measures and coding systems and very similar sampling schemes. The surveyed
firms are largely private and formal in the sense of following some regulations,
though not necessarily labor regulations.
An important point of departure taken in this paper from some earlier applications
of both the obstacles and enforcement approaches is to use not the firm’s own subject-
ive evaluations of the various obstacles or enforcement proxies which could be subject
to selection bias, but rather the average evaluations of all firms in the same industry,
location, and country as the firm under consideration but excluding the firm’s own
evaluation.
Given that firm-supplied training (Trainingijc) is measured by whether or not firm i
in industry j and country c has offered training in the period under study, and assuming
that a profit-maximizing firm will choose to offer training to its workforce only if doing
so is expected to raise its profits (πijc), that firm will offer training only if:
Trainingijc ¼




where πij should be regarded as accruing jointly to both employers and workers and isassumed to be a linear function of a number of observable firm, industry, and country
characteristics including labor regulations and their enforcement:
πijc ¼ β1Xcj þ β2Y ijc þ β3 Xcj  Y ijc
 þ β4Zijc þ μc þ μj þ εijc; ð2Þ
where Xcj is a measure of the rigidity of labor regulations at the level of the neighborhood
or industry of firm j, Yijc is a vector of enforcement measures of labor regulations
(again measured as an average of other firms in the same neighborhood), (Xcj * Yijc)
captures relevant interactions between the two sets of variables, and Zijc represents
the various relevant firm-level characteristics. The parameters μj and μc represent
time-invariant unobserved characteristics of industry and country, respectively,
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incidence. The probability that firm i offers training is now:
Pr Trainingijc ¼ 1
 





If the residuals, εijc, are normally distributed, equation (3) can be estimated bymaximum likelihood (probit).
Unfortunately, Enterprise Surveys are not yet available for all countries in the MENA
region. Those used in this study are those for Algeria 2007, Egypt 2004, 2007 and 2008,
Iraq 2011, Lebanon 2006 and 2009, Morocco 2004, Oman 2003, Syria 2003 and 2009,
and Yemen 2010.3
Descriptive statistics on all variables used in the analysis for the samples of firms in
MENA countries are presented in Table 2 (and for use in subsequent comparison with
Non-MENA countries also for the Non-MENA sample). The definitions of all these
variables are given in Table 3. As indicated in Table 2, about 15% of the sample MENA
firms provided training to their workers in the year preceding the survey, compared to
24% in the Non-MENA sample. Actually, this comparison is more favorable to MENA
than was depicted in column (5) of Table 1. This is because the two MENA countries
with the highest probabilities of training, namely Lebanon and Syria, are heavily
weighted in the current MENA sample (with two surveys each), while those countries
with low training rates, such as Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza, are excluded (be-
cause of missing data on key variables in their respective surveys).
Note from the last column that the means of these variables are almost invariably
significantly different from those in the Non-MENA sample. As in earlier studies with
the Enterprise Surveys, in general, the labor obstacle is not ranked as very serious, but
this varies quite significantly both within and between countries. Yet, the average for
firms in the MENA region (1.30) is considerably higher than that for Non-MENA firms
(1.09). Notice also that there is remarkably wide variation across MENA countries
(reflected by much larger ratios of standard deviations to the means) than in the
Non-MENA sample for each of the three labor rigidity indexes. These are: an overall
index (IndexO, an index on hiring rules alone (IndexH) and one on firing rules (IndexF)),
each taken from the Doing Business Database. While the averages of IndexO are similar
(just under 30) in MENA and Non-MENA, those for the two major components, IndexH
and IndexF, are very different (MENA’s average being much lower for IndexH but much
higher for IndexF). MENA firms face lower tax rates, are older and larger, more likely to
be solely owned or a partnership, less likely to have experienced sales growth of over 50%
in the last couple of years, to own a quality certificate, a website and to do business
through email than Non-MENA firms. While there is little difference between MENA
and Non-MENA samples for one of our enforcement proxies (the mean number of visits
by tax officials), for the other two enforcement measures (the time of the top manager(s)
spent on regulations (Management Time) and the percent of firms indicating that compe-
tition from informal firms is not even a moderate obstacle to the firm’s business (Obstacle
Informal Low), the means are considerably lower among MENA firms than among
Non-MENA firms. These differences reflect lower levels of enforcement in MENA. In
addition, offering gifts to officers is more frequent in MENA, implying that, even when
there is some enforcement, such “gifts” offer a way around the regulations.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for MENA and Non-MENA countries
Variable Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD Min Max Difference
MENA Non-MENA
Year 3778 2008.4 1.55 41854 2008.2 2.06 2006 2012 −0.2***
GDP per capita 3778 4791.8 1424.3 37043 7351.03 4829.9 284.2 23167.8 2559.2***
Total tax rate 3778 47.4 14.03 41854 54.55 37.42 16.5 287.1 7.2***
Rule of Law 3778 4.3 1.8 40871 4.92 1.08 1 8.39 0.63***
IndexH 3778 17.2 20.1 41854 44.23 26.07 0 100 27.04***
IndexF 3778 46.2 16.4 41854 29.46 23.64 0 70 −16.70***
IndexO 3778 28.9 5.16 41854 29.97 14.95 4 66 1.07***
Education spending 3778 4.9 2.11 41697 4.07 1.41 1.1 10.7 −0.82***
Capital city 3778 0.26 0.44 41854 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.12***
Textiles 3778 0.09 0.29 41524 0.05 0.22 0 1 −0.04***
Garments 3778 0.10 0.30 41854 0.09 0.28 0 1 −0.02***
Textiles and garments 3778 0.196 0.397 41854 0.14 0.35 0 1 −0.06***
Food 3778 0.096 0.29 41854 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.03***
Other manufacture 3778 0.54 0.50 41854 0.35 0.48 0 1 −0.19***
Multi-plant 3778 0.20 0.40 41854 0.15 0.39 0 1 −0.05***
Sole owner 3778 0.43 0.50 41854 0.27 0.45 0 1 −0.16***
Partner 3778 0.14 0.35 41854 0.06 0.24 0 1 −0.08***
Percent private 3774 93.80 23.16 41144 90.11 28.14 0 100 −3.7***
Percent foreign 3778 1.88 12.05 41854 8.88 26.82 0 100 6.9***
Percent government 3778 2.39 14.41 41854 0.31 4.65 0 100 −2.08***

















Table 2 Descriptive statistics for MENA and Non-MENA countries (Continued)
Quality certificate 3778 0.16 0.36 41854 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.05***
Sales export 3778 7.50 20.81 41854 8.42 22.74 0 100 0.9*
Website 3778 0.30 0.46 41854 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.1***
Email 3778 0.42 0.49 41854 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.3***
Gift officer 3778 1.88 6.67 41854 0.98 4.19 0 100 −0.9***
Manager experience 3778 14.96 11.18 41854 17.76 11.74 0 75 2.8***
Crime 3778 0.98 7.98 41854 0.58 3.28 0 100 −0.40***
Management time 3778 9.49 18.22 41854 11.96 17.95 0 100 2.5***
Inspections tax 3019 3.89 7.12 24192 3.58 5.56 0 100 −0.31**
Total tax ratex mean log (Inspect. tax) 3778 63.95 25.08 41854 68.27 62.96 0 924.14 4.3***
Size 3778 193.04 802.97 41854 111.58 517.48 0 27802 −81.5***
Average labor change 3568 15.17 58.77 38503 45.37 175.94 −96.0 11064.3 30.2***
Female owner 3778 0.18 0.38 41854 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.15***
Relative labor productivity 3711 2.05 20.70 41816 1.01 6.77 0 803.0 −1.04***
Finance WC internal 3778 83.57 28.91 41854 65.43 36.29 0 100 −18.1***
Water out 3778 0.77 0.42 41854 0.92 0.28 0 1 0.15***
Power out 3778 0.739 0.44 41854 0.59 0.49 0 1 −0.15***
Sales Growth > 50 3778 0.048 0.21 41854 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.19***
Sales growth < −20 3778 0.24 0.43 41854 0.09 0.29 0 1 −0.15***
Training 3778 0.15 0.36 41854 0.24 0.42 0 1 0.08***
Obstacle labor 3732 1.30 1.4 41693 1.09 1.22 0 4 −0.21***
Obstacle education 3778 1.79 1.6 41854 1.43 1.32 0 4 −0.36***

















Table 2 Descriptive statistics for MENA and Non-MENA countries (Continued)
Obstacle informal low 3778 0.31 0.46 41854 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.16***
Obstacle education2 3778 0.38 0.49 41854 0.25 0.43 0 1 −0.14***
Obstacle Labor2 3732 0.23 0.42 41693 0.15 0.36 0 1 −0.081***
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank). The enforcement measure Obstacle Informal Low was generated using firm's response to the question about perceived severity of anti-
competitive or informal practices coded as Obstacle Informal. Obstacle Informal Low is, therefore, a dummy variable equal to one if Obstacle Informal is either 0 or 1 on a four-point scale from 0 to 4 (i.e., no or minor

















Table 3 Definition of variables
Variable Definition
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)
IndexH Index of labor law rigidity to hiring
IndexF Index of labor law rigidity to firing
IndexO Overall index of labor law rigidity
Total tax rate Total tax rates (Doing Business Database)
Rule of law Index for the quality of Legal System and Property Rights
(Economic Freedom of the World)
Education spending Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP
Capital city (Dummy) Location in capital city
Industry (Dummy) Type of industry
Textiles (Dummy) Textile industry
Garments (Dummy) Garment industry
Textiles and Garments (Dummy) Textile and/or garment industry
Food (Dummy) Food industry
Other manufacture (Dummy) Other manufacturing industry
Multi-Plant (Dummy) Multi-plant firm
Sole owner (Dummy) Sole proprietorship
Partner (Dummy) Partnership
Percent private Percentage of the firm owned by private domestic individuals,
companies or organizations
Percent foreign Percentage of the firm owned by private foreign individuals,
companies or organizations
Percent government Percentage of the firm owned by government/state
Age Number of years since the establishment began operations in the country
Quality certificate (Dummy) Possession of internationally-recognized quality certification
Sales export Percentage of total sales exported
Email (Dummy) Firm uses email in communications with clients or suppliers
Gift officer Percent of annual sales paid as a gift or an informal payment
Manager experience Manager’s experience in sector
Crime Losses due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson
Management time Percentage of senior management's time spent in dealing with regulations
Inspections tax Number of times inspected by or met with tax officials
Size Total number of full-time permanent and seasonal/temporary workers
Average labor change Average annual percentage change in the total number of full-time
employees
Female owner (Dummy) Female owner
Relative labor productivity Sales per worker relative to the country and industry average
Finance working capital
internal
Percent of working capital financed using internal funds or retained earnings
Water out (Dummy) Incidence of water outages
Power out (Dummy) Incidence of power outages
Sales growth > 50 (Dummy) Sales growth rate greater than fifty percent
Sales growth < −20 (Dummy) Sales growth rate less than negative twenty percent
Training (Dummy) Incidence of training
Obstacles: Severity of the obstacle: No Obstacle (0), Minor Obstacle (1), Moderate
obstacle (2), Major Obstacle (3), or Very Severe Obstacle (4)
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Table 3 Definition of variables (Continued)
Obstacle labor Labor regulations
Obstacle education Inadequately educated workforce
Obstacle informal Practices of competitors in the informal sector
Obstacle education2 (Dummy) Skills and education of available workers
Obstacle labor2 (Dummy) Labor regulations
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After testing for the influence of outliers, variables with many missing observations and
multicollinearity, we arrived at the relatively full specification that yielded results
presented in column (1) of Table 4. While the variables included in the benchmark
specification allow us to control for many firm characteristics, to deal with the
dearth of industry and country controls, we control for unobservable factors at the
industry and country levels by including fixed effects for industry and country.
Each separate column of Table 4 provides a set of estimates of the marginal effects
derived from the estimates from probit equation (3) with the unchanging set of
explanatory variables listed in the lower portion of the table but with one-at-a-time
changes in the term interacted with Mean Obstacle Labor in the top portion of the
table. Column (2) presents the corresponding result when our preferred enforcement
measure Obstacle Informal Low is added. Our use of interaction terms in columns
(3)-(5) is prompted by the aforementioned studies of Almeida and Carneiro (2008),
and the many other studies cited above suggesting that labor regulations may have
very different effects on firm performance depending on their enforcement.
Obstacle Informal Low is our preferred measure of enforcement for the MENA
region because it more completely captures the essence of enforcement for firms in a
particular location and industry.4 To be included in the survey, each firm is at least
somewhat formal, implying that it may face competition from firms which do not
adhere to the labor and other regulations and thus would be free of any cost-increasing
effects of complying with these regulations. If enforcement were weak, there could be
many such low cost informal firms constituting an important obstacle to the formal
firm’s business. For this reason we deem responses indicating that competition from
informal firms is a serious obstacle to the firm’s business to be a solid indication
of weak enforcement of regulations in the MENA region, and the absence of such
complaints (Obstacle Informal Low) one of strong enforcement. As with Mean
Obstacle Labor, eliminating the assessment of the individual firm itself from its
construction serves to limit self-selection bias.
In the top row of the table are the estimates of the direct effects of our key
micro-level (neighborhood) measure of the seriousness of labor regulations as an
obstacle to the firm’s business operations (Mean Obstacle Labor) obtained from the
different specifications. In the rows immediately below this one are the estimated
coefficients of the enforcement and alternative interaction terms. These estimates are all
important to this study as they reflect how the effects of existing labor regulations, as
perceived by firms in the immediate (industry and location) neighborhood of the firm,
vary with the level of the variable with which it is interacted (Obstacle Informal Low,
Textiles or Finance Working Capital Internal).
Table 4 Determinants of training incidence (MENA and Non-MENA samples – marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MENA Non-MENA
Mean obstacle labor −0.00453 −0.00554 −0.0272** −0.0102 −0.0838*** 0.0116 0.00873 0.00179
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0145) (0.0109) (0.00995) (0.0101) (0.0108)
Obstacle informal low 0.0512***
x Mean obstacle labor (0.00780)
Textiles 0.0535** 0.0234***
x Mean obstacle labor (0.0250) (0.00873)
Finance working capital internal 0.000986*** 0.000161***
x Mean Obstacle labor (0.000251) (4.95e-05)
Obstacle informal low 0.0302*** −0.0345**
(0.00647) (0.0144)
Mean management time 0.00428 0.00423 0.00413 0.00436 0.00433 −0.000371 −0.000324 −0.000366
(0.00317) (0.00324) (0.00321) (0.00312) (0.00316) (0.000511) (0.000514) (0.000511)
Mean log (Inspections tax) 0.0894 0.0908 0.0818 0.114 0.0837 0.0398 0.0549** 0.0393
(0.129) (0.131) (0.129) (0.123) (0.130) (0.0260) (0.0274) (0.0260)
Total tax rate −0.00105 −0.00110 −0.000846 −0.00147 −0.000959 −0.000484 −0.00078** −0.000476
x Mean log (Inspections tax) (0.00219) (0.00224) (0.00221) (0.00209) (0.00219) (0.000361) (0.000374) (0.000359)
Sales growth > 50 0.0327* 0.0361* 0.0381** 0.0332* 0.0353* 0.0138** 0.0144** 0.0137**
(0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0179) (0.0190) (0.0186) (0.00604) (0.00604) (0.00603)
Sales Growth < −20 0.0333** 0.0271 0.0283 0.0332** 0.0327* −0.0125* −0.0129* −0.0125*
(0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.00670) (0.00680) (0.00668)
Finance working capital internal −0.00039*** −0.00040*** −0.00040*** −0.00039*** −0.0016*** −0.00012** −0.00011* −0.00033***
(0.000117) (0.000125) (0.000120) (0.000117) (0.000301) (5.82e-05) (5.84e-05) (0.000108)

















Table 4 Determinants of training incidence (MENA and Non-MENA samples – marginal effects) (Continued)
(0.0242) (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Power out 0.0101 0.00953 0.0101 0.0105 0.0114 0.0305*** 0.0307*** 0.0304***
(0.0375) (0.0397) (0.0393) (0.0376) (0.0370) (0.00749) (0.00759) (0.00748)
Log (Size) 0.0336*** 0.0334*** 0.0331*** 0.0332*** 0.0340*** 0.0413*** 0.0418*** 0.0413***
(0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00988) (0.00999) (0.00263) (0.00263) (0.00262)
Capital city 0.0224** 0.0285*** 0.0291*** 0.0242** 0.0200* −0.00456 −0.00437 −0.00435
(0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.00815) (0.00806) (0.00817)
Multi-plant 0.0651*** 0.0676*** 0.0669*** 0.0647*** 0.0653*** 0.0165** 0.0167** 0.0164**
(0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.00731) (0.00737) (0.00729)
Percent foreign 0.000962*** 0.000867*** 0.000864*** 0.000970*** 0.000972*** 9.01e-05 8.03e-05 8.92e-05
(0.000188) (0.000156) (0.000162) (0.000192) (0.000188) (7.29e-05) (7.37e-05) (7.32e-05)
Percent government −0.000271 −0.000251 −0.000234 −0.000277 −0.000296 0.000436 0.000444 0.000423
(0.000473) (0.000484) (0.000483) (0.000475) (0.000449) (0.000301) (0.000302) (0.000303)
Quality certificate 0.0871*** 0.0810*** 0.0813*** 0.0867*** 0.0880*** 0.0753*** 0.0763*** 0.0754***
(0.00895) (0.00844) (0.00888) (0.00897) (0.00862) (0.00699) (0.00710) (0.00698)
Crime −0.00120** −0.00122** −0.00123** −0.00120** −0.00131** 0.000159 0.000180 0.000137
(0.000556) (0.000579) (0.000566) (0.000548) (0.000578) (0.000733) (0.000742) (0.000735)
Sole Owner −0.0112 −0.0100 −0.00860 −0.0130 −0.0108 −0.0177*** −0.0168** −0.0175***
(0.0202) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.00671) (0.00675) (0.00668)
Partner −0.00132 0.00159 0.00331 −0.00354 −0.000173 −0.0258** −0.0271** −0.0257**
(0.0210) (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0195) (0.0208) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0129)
Log (Age) −0.0281*** −0.0286*** −0.0274*** −0.0288*** −0.0270*** 0.00183 0.00156 0.00185
(0.00563) (0.00544) (0.00531) (0.00557) (0.00521) (0.00349) (0.00351) (0.00346)
Email 0.0370** 0.0374** 0.0378** 0.0371** 0.0376** 0.0565*** 0.0562*** 0.0560***

















Table 4 Determinants of training incidence (MENA and Non-MENA samples – marginal effects) (Continued)
Website 0.0332* 0.0342 0.0347 0.0332 0.0327 0.0327*** 0.0327*** 0.0328***
(0.0202) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.00690) (0.00696) (0.00691)
Log (Manager Experience) 0.0277*** 0.0282*** 0.0278*** 0.0278*** 0.0277*** 0.0123** 0.0121** 0.0122**
(0.00928) (0.00946) (0.00970) (0.00939) (0.00944) (0.00484) (0.00487) (0.00483)
Log (Sales Export) 0.00133 0.00126 0.00101 0.00108 0.00121 0.0131*** 0.0129*** 0.0131***
(0.00447) (0.00477) (0.00467) (0.00439) (0.00438) (0.00222) (0.00218) (0.00221)
Female Owner 0.00477 0.00427 0.00409 0.00354 0.00546 0.0131** 0.0131** 0.0129**
(0.0268) (0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0269) (0.00542) (0.00543) (0.00543)
Gift Officer 0.00311 0.00313 0.00308 0.00313 0.00311 0.000767* 0.000804* 0.000747*
(0.00228) (0.00238) (0.00232) (0.00227) (0.00230) (0.000438) (0.000446) (0.000441)
Obstacle Education2 0.0180 0.0211 0.0213 0.0174 0.0171 0.0283*** 0.0283*** 0.0282***
(0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.00361) (0.00364) (0.00359)
Log (Education Spending) 1.221* 1.177 1.251* 1.231* 1.254* −0.187*** −0.193*** −0.186***
(0.705) (0.734) (0.711) (0.715) (0.673) (0.0409) (0.0420) (0.0409)
Country & industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.206 0.210 0.211 0.207 0.208 0.342 0.342 0.342
Observations 3,325 3,270 3,270 3,325 3,325 40,590 40,260 40,590
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Labor for the MENA sample to be negative but not always statistically significant,
consistent with the widely reported low level of enforcement. In columns (3) and (5) in
which interaction terms were added, these coefficients take on somewhat larger
negative values and are statistically significant. In column (2), which includes our
preferred measure of enforcement, Mean Obstacle Informal Low, the marginal effect
exercised by that enforcement measure 0.0302, is sufficiently large as to more than
offset the negative effect of even a large value of the Mean Obstacle Labor (of say 3)
multiplied by its coefficient of −0.005 so that the combination of the two would be
positive (and about 1.5 %). In column (3), where the interaction between these two
measures is also included, the effect of enforcement by itself becomes negative and
significant, as is also the effect of Mean Obstacle Labor. Yet, both of these negative
effects would be more than offset by the positive interaction effect (0.0512) for reasonably
high values of Mean Obstacle Labor. The column (3) result, therefore, supports our main
hypothesis for MENA firms that, when the regulations are well-enforced, firms perceiving
the labor regulations to be at least moderately serious obstacles to business are
actually more likely to provide training to their workers than firms which do not
view the regulations to be a serious obstacle.
Clearly, from the positive and significant interaction terms in columns (4) and (5),
firms in textiles and those lacking access to external finance have positive interaction
effects that offset the direct negative effects of the perceived seriousness of the labor
regulations on training. In the former case, we attribute this to the labor intensity and
competitiveness of textiles and in the latter case to the fact that they are complements
to one another in their influence on training.
Turn next to the results in columns (6)-(8), which are those based on firms from the
Non-MENA sample corresponding to the specifications for MENA firms in columns
(1), (4) and (5). As can easily be seen, there are substantial differences from the
corresponding results in the MENA sample. Indeed, for the Non-MENA sample, none of
the direct effects of Mean Obstacle Labor are negative and statistically significant. Yet, the
effects of the interactions involving textiles and lack of access to external finance
in columns (7) and (8) are positive and significant (just as they were in columns
(4) and (5) for MENA firms), presumably for similar reasons.
Next, we turn to the simpler direct effects of the other enforcement proxies, Mean
Management Time and Mean Log (Inspections Tax), in the next two rows of Table 4.
For the MENA sample in columns (1)-(5), the estimated marginal effects of these
variables are all positive but not statistically significant, in contrast to those with
our preferred enforcement proxy, Obstacle Informal Low. For the Non-MENA
sample, where the Obstacle Informal Low measure of enforcement is not available,
neither the direct effect of labor regulations (Mean Obstacle Labor) nor that of the
Mean Management Time measure of enforcement exerts a statistically significant effect,
but in column (7) the effect of the third enforcement proxy (Mean Log Inspection Tax)
becomes positive and significant.
From the next row in the table, it can be seen that, for the MENA sample, the
interaction term between Mean Log (Inspections Tax) and the Total Tax Rate does
have the significant negative effect on Training that one might expect. That effect
is negative and significant, however, in column (8) for the non-MENA sample.
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more are positive and significant in each column, though larger in the MENA sample than
in the Non-MENA sample. Among the presumably negative external shocks, only the
effect of Water Out is negative in both regions, more significantly so in the Non-MENA
sample. Counterintuitively, the negative sales growth shock has a positive and sometimes
significant effect in the MENA sample. Notably, Power Out has a positive and significant
effect in the Non-MENA region. As expected, the apparent lack of access to external
finance for working capital (measured by Finance Working Capital Internal) has a highly
significant negative effect on the probability of training in both samples, but is somewhat
larger in absolute terms in the MENA sample. As expected, because of economies of scale
and scope in training, in both samples, firms which are larger or have more than one plant
are more likely to train than others.
Another interesting difference is that the effect of location in the Capital City is
positive and significant in MENA but not in Non-MENA. Once again, this could be
attributed to enforcement since in most countries enforcement of regulations tends to
be stricter in capital cities than elsewhere. Several other significant differences in the
estimated effects on training between the two samples are for: (1) foreign ownership
(having a positive effect in MENA but not elsewhere), (2) Crime (having a negative
effect in MENA but not elsewhere), (3) Age (having a significant negative effect on
training in MENA but not elsewhere), (4) share of exports in total sales, female
ownership, and lack of skills of the labor force as a serious obstacle to business
(Obstacle Education2) all having positive and statistically significant effects on
training in Non-MENA firms but not MENA firms, and (5) the share of educational
spending in GDP, the effect being positive and significant in the results for the MENA
sample but negative and significant in the Non-MENA sample. This latter difference
could be interpreted as implying that educational quality is lower in MENA than
Non-MENA (reflected in the higher mean for this variable in Table 2 for MENA),
thereby suggesting that further increases in educational quality and quantity would
do more to increase the incidence of training in MENA than elsewhere.
The results presented in Table 4, therefore, amply demonstrate (1) the complementarity
between enforcement (proxied by Obstacle Informal Low) and the rigidity of labor
regulations (measured by Mean Obstacle Labor) in the MENA sample, and (2) the
many important differences in effects on training between the MENA and Non-MENA
samples. The table did not, however, show the effects of interactions between Mean
Obstacle Labor and the other enforcement proxies or of any differences in the
rigidities of different types of labor regulations (which could be quite relevant given
the large differences in the means of the rigidities in hiring and firing between
MENA and Non-MENA) shown in Table 2.
To that end, in Table 5 we narrow our focus to the MENA sample alone but examine
the effects of different enforcement proxies, on the one hand, and of the different labor
regulation rigidity indexes (hiring (IndexH) and firing (IndexF)) on the other. In each
of the six different columns of Table 5, we include a slightly different interaction term
in the top rows of the table but the same set of additional controls as in Table 4. Yet,
since the effects of the latter controls differed only slightly across the columns in
Table 4 and are almost identical to those obtained from the specifications for MENA
firms in Table 5, in the interest of space these are not presented in Table 5.
Table 5 Determinants of training incidence (marginal effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Obstacle Labor 0.00357 0.00496 −0.00334 −0.00363
(0.0168) (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0204)
IndexH −0.000575
x Mean Obstacle Labor (0.000518)
IndexH −0.000298
x Mean Obstacle Labor (0.000300)
x Obstacle Informal Low
IndexF −0.000267
x Mean Obstacle Labor (0.000241)
IndexF 0.000639**
x Mean Obstacle Labor (0.000289)
x Obstacle Informal Low
IndexH −0.00028***
x Mean Management Time (2.58e-05)
IndexF 0.000438***
x Mean Management Time (0.000121)
IndexH 0.000296
x Log (Inspections Tax) (0.000504)
IndexF 0.000212***
x Log (Inspections Tax) (2.59e-05)
Obstacle Informal Low 0.0335*** −0.0119
(0.00476) (0.0269)
Mean Management Time 0.00431 0.00414 0.0113*** −0.0153** 0.00495 0.00491
(0.00317) (0.00315) (0.00127) (0.00632) (0.00358) (0.00355)
Mean Log (Inspections Tax) 0.0669 0.0907 0.104 0.136 −0.0117 −0.0220
(0.110) (0.126) (0.120) (0.115) (0.116) (0.117)
Total Tax Rate −0.000564 −0.00105 −0.00108 −0.00171 0.00127 0.00144
x Mean Log (Inspections Tax) (0.00183) (0.00211) (0.00192) (0.00184) (0.00193) (0.00192)
Country & Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.209 0.221 0.219 0.201 0.202
Observations 3,325 3,325 3,325 3,325 2,770 2,770
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm offers formal on-the-job training to its
employees. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Low (which was used in column (2) of Table 4) but in this case, weighting both Mean
Obstacle Labor and its interaction with Obstacle Informal Low, first with either IndexH
in column (1) or IndexF in column (2). While weighting both terms by IndexH renders
the effects of both terms statistically insignificant in column (1), weighting with IndexF
makes the effect of the direct term negative but insignificant but that of the interaction
term positive and significant as it was in Table 4. Once again, this result underscores the
complementarity between the rigidity of the labor regulations (in this case limited only to
firing) and our preferred enforcement proxy in the MENA sample in their effects on
Training.
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Obstacle Labor by itself, in the remaining columns of the table we include Mean
Obstacle Labor by itself but apply the IndexH or IndexF weights to each of the two
other enforcement proxies. The results of column (3) show that, when the IndexH
weight is applied to Mean Management Time, its effect on Training is negative and
significant and that of the un-weighted term Mean Management Time by itself is
positive and significant. This implies that at low levels of IndexH, the direct effect of
Mean Management Time will dominate over the interaction term so that the overall
effect of enforcement on training will be positive, whereas when IndexH is 50 or more,
the overall effect will be negative. On the other hand, when IndexF is used in the
interaction terms as in column (4), the opposite occurs: the direct effect of Mean
Management Time is negative, but the interaction term is positive and significant
such that at values of IndexF above 35, the overall net effect on training would be
positive, but below that it would be negative.
Finally, in the last two columns of the table we present estimates similar to those in
columns (3) and (4) but with the third enforcement proxy, Mean Log (Inspections
Tax). Once again, the direct effects of this enforcement proxy are positive but not
significant but, while its interaction with IndexH has no significant effect on training,
the one with IndexF has once again a positive and significant effect. Hence, from the
three sets of columns in Table 5, it should be clear that, when enforcement is directed
to firms facing highly rigid regulations on firing, the effect on training is likely to be
considerably more positive than when it is directed to firms facing more rigid regulations
on hiring. Although not shown here, the results for the control variables (available
on request) are almost identical to those for the MENA sample in Table 4. Hence,
all the aforementioned results for these variables from Table 4 hold also for Table 5.
Various measures and procedures in the analysis could have been done differently,
and many of these alternative estimates have been obtained for robustness purposes
but usually only for the standard specification. One alternative procedure which
was applied to all the results is estimation by a linear probability model instead of
Probit. These alternative estimates of Tables 4 and 5 are available as Tables A1 and
A2 in Section A of an Additional file 1, showing that, with a few minor exceptions,
the results are quite robust.5
One might also like to know how different the results of Table 4 for MENA would be
if a more quantitative measure of training, for example the percentage of skilled
workers trained, were used in place of the Training dummy used in Tables 4 and 5. To
this end, we present in Table A3 of Section B of the Additional file 1 OLS and censored
regression model (Tobit) estimates from a much smaller sample of MENA firms for
whom answers to the more quantitative training measure were available. For robustness
purposes, in the third column of this same table A3, we also present results obtained
from a generalized linear model (GLM) in which the dependent variable is a fraction
ranging between zero and one. The three models produce very similar results, though
with Tobit estimates providing the best fit.
Although some of the coefficients obtained using this alternative measure of Training
are much larger in magnitude, a majority of the results are qualitatively almost identical
to those obtained from using the Training dummy. There is a strong negative and
statistically significant effect of Mean Obstacle Labor on the percentage of skilled
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between Mean Obstacle Labor and our preferred measure of enforcement, Mean
Obstacle Informal Low, is not large enough to more than offset the negative effect
of Mean Obstacle Labor at least when we use the censored regression model which
yields the most significant results. Although not discussed here, the results for the
control variables are also almost identical to those for the Training dummy used in
Tables 4 and 5.
A few exceptions in which there are some significant differences in these estimated
effects on training between these two measures are for: (1) foreign ownership
(having a positive effect under Training dummy but not when percentage of skilled
workers trained is used), (2) a significant negative impact of Mean Management Time on
training when the dependent variable is a fraction of skilled workers trained, (3) positive
effect of finance working capital internal on the percentage of skilled workers trained but
negative on the probability of training, (4) effects for the MENA region of ownership
variables, such as Sole, Partner, and Female Owner, that are statistically significant only
when we use the quantitative measure of Training, and (5) a significant negative impact
of percentage of sales exported on training when the dependent variable is a fraction of
skilled workers trained.
In short, the use of percentage of skilled workers trained as an alternative measure of
training validates our main results derived from our proposed dummy variable
Training. This is especially true because of a strong positive correlation between
these two measures across MENA countries as a group as well as for many individual
MENA countries (available on request).
Finally, since our measure of the Rigidity of Labor Regulations is based on the
reported perceptions of these as an obstacle to business by the individual firms,
readers might well be suspicious about the ability of such perceptions to reflect
realities in the field. Therefore, in Table A4 in Section C of our Additional file 1,
we present results obtained by relating the perceived values of Obstacle Labor back
on the objectively measured Rigidity Indexes of Labor Regulations (Indexo, Indexf
and Indexf), the enforcement measures and other controls including Average Obstacle,
the average of some ten or more obstacles identified in the Enterprise Surveys, designed
to capture the idiosyncrasies of individual managers to rate all obstacles as serious
and thereby the influence of personality biases. As can be seen, the objective labor
rigidity indexes, the enforcement measures and interactions thereof are all statistically
significant, thereby serving to increase confidence in the relevance of the measures
we have used.6 Conclusions
Let us return to the primary objective of this study, namely to identify possible reasons
why MENA firms are less likely to offer training to their workers than firms in other
developing countries despite the fact that MENA firms rate their workers’ lack of skills
a more serious obstacle to their businesses than firms in other developing countries. By
identifying these factors, we hope to present policy makers with some policy options
that would encourage private firms to offer training (without subsidies or government
participation).
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means of the different firm and other characteristics between the MENA and
Non-MENA samples in Table 2, (2) identifying differences in the estimated effects
of the rigidity of labor regulations, their enforcement and other firm and industry
characteristics between the MENA and Non-MENA samples of Table 4, and (3) by
comparing the results in Tables 4 and 5 of different specifications of the interactions
between different types of labor regulations and enforcement mechanisms within
the MENA sample itself.
With respect to the enforcement measures in the first exercise, while we found little
difference in Table 2 between the MENA and Non-MENA means for the number of
visits by tax inspectors (which in any case is not directly related to labor inspectors),
the means of Management Time spent on regulations and Obstacle Informal Low are
both significantly lower for MENA than for Non-MENA firms.6 That the mean for Gift
Officer is also higher in MENA than Non-MENA implies that, even when enforcement
efforts are present, their effectiveness could be undermined through bribery. Since
enforcement can be expected to be higher among firms located in the capital city
and foreign owned, the fact that the means of these characteristics are significantly
lower in MENA firms would also seem to contribute to the observed lower inci-
dence of firm-supplied training in MENA firms. Similarly, since firms owned by a
single owner or a partnership could be expected to be more difficult to find and
monitor for violations of regulations, the higher means on these two variables
may also contribute to weaker enforcement and its significantly lower incidence of
training in MENA.
Then, with respect to other firm characteristics, quite obviously, the lower averages
among MENA firms for favorable firm characteristics like higher sales growth,
managerial experience, technological sophistication (reflected in the possession of a
Quality Certificate, a Website and the use of Email) would also seem to contribute
to the low incidence of Training in MENA. By the same token, MENA firms’
higher means for the absence of external credit (Finance Working Capital Internal), Mean
Obstacle Labor, Sole Owner, and Crime, all considered characteristics unfavorable to
Training, could also contribute to MENA’s low incidence of training.
But, how much difference would such changes make? Table 6 presents estimates of
the magnitudes of these effects obtained by multiplying the differences in means for
each of the aforementioned characteristics (from Table 2) by its corresponding
estimated marginal impact on training from column (1) of Table 4. These represent the
estimated magnitudes by which training would increase as a result of each such change
in mean characteristics. While most of these are individually rather small, when added
together, the probability of training could be increased by more than 0.1168, i.e.,
11.68%. If all these changes could be accomplished, such an increase would represent an
increase of well over 70% in the existing propensity to train (of about 0.15) by
surveyed firms in MENA countries. If we add to this the effects of lowering the
unfavorable characteristics of the several variables listed on the right hand columns
of Part A of the table as in the second exercise mentioned above, it would appear
that training by firms could be increased by an additional 1.6%.
Then in Table 7 we turn to the third exercise, that is, relating differences in the
coefficients of the corresponding favorable and unfavorable characteristics. Among
Table 6 Simulated potential gains in the probability of training
Variable Raising MENA Mean of
Favorable Characteristic
Variable Lowering MENA Mean of
Unfavorable Characteristic
Capital city 0.002676 Sole Owner 0.00174
Percent foreign 0.006832 Age 0.00616
Quality certificate 0.003536 Crime 0.000425
Sales export 0.001296 Finance WC Internal 0.006783





Sales growth > 50 0.006384
Total 0.116804 Total 0.015982
Gains from Raising Means of Favorable MENA Characteristics and Lowering Those of Unfavorable Characteristics to Those
of Non-MENA
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Education2 and among the unfavorable characteristics, Sole Owner. The largest of
these is Sales Export, a favorable characteristic for training which was shown to
have a much larger positive effect in Non-MENA than in MENA. Once again, if all
these individual behavioral effects were changed, the results suggest that training could be
increased by another 10% or more.
Naturally, not all of these firm characteristics can immediately be changed by decree.
For example, raising the incidence of websites and quality certificates, the share of
exports in total sales or their effects on training among MENA firms all require time to
change either firm behavior or allow appropriate policy changes to become effective.
What MENA governments can control directly, however, are labor regulations, their
enforcement and educational expenditures. Raising enforcement for given rigidity of
the labor regulations and switching from greater enforcement of hiring rules to that of
firing rules by themselves could, according to the results presented here, contribute
quite substantially to increased training by firms.7 In the case of labor regulations,
looking across the sample of results for the MENA sample in Tables 4 and 5 and
comparing these with the corresponding results for the Non-MENA sample in
Table 4, one can see that the effect of perceived obstacles in the form of labor reg-
ulations is more likely to be negative and statistically significant for MENA firms
than for Non-MENA firms. Hence, reducing this by way of the actual rigidity ofTable 7 Gains from raising estimated coefficients of favorable variables and lowering those of
unfavorable variables to those of Non-MENA
Variable Raising MENA Estimated Coefficient
of Favorable Characteristic
Variable Lowering MENA Estimated Coefficient
of Unfavorable Characteristic




Total 0.102156 Total 0.00304
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in Table 5), would also seem to be a direct way to increase the likelihood of train-
ing. From the results of Table 4, for the MENA countries at least, an increase in
educational spending would also be expected to have a significant positive effect
on Training.
Recall that when interactions between Mean Obstacle Labor and our preferred measure
of enforcement Obstacle Informal Low are allowed for as in columns (3) of Table 4 and
(2) of Table 5, the interaction terms become positive and significant, but primarily only
when rigidity of regulations on firing is concerned as in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 5.
This complicates the determination of the net effects of changes in these measures on
Training. From the relevant parameter estimates of Table 5, however, it can be seen that,
when enforcement of the firing regulations is quite high and the firing regulations scored
as being fairly high (i.e., at least moderately rigid), the positive impact of these interaction
terms will more than counterbalance the direct negative effect of Mean Obstacle
Labor.8 Hence, from the point of view of firm-supplied training at least, it should
be clear that priority in enforcement of labor regulations should be given to the
regulations on firing.
Hence, the three most important actions that policy makers in MENA countries can
do to raise the incidence of training on the part of firms in any particular country in
the short run are (1) to reduce the rigidity in the hiring index, (2) to increase enforce-
ment of regulations on firing and (3) to increase the quality and quantity of educa-
tion (in the latter case to increase the trainability of workers). All three of these
actions are consistent with the simple model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998),
explaining the success of Germany’s apprentice program. Targeting enforcement ef-
forts to both industries like Textiles, which are labor intensive and for which the enforce-
ment interaction effect (column (3) of Table 4) is especially large and positive, and to the
various types of firms which have thus far managed to escape enforcement efforts could
yield still larger effects.
In the longer run, the calculations shown in Table 6 suggest that increasing managerial
experience, access to external finance, foreign ownership, and sales growth, and inducing
export-oriented firms to undertake training might increase the incidence of firm-supplied
training in MENA countries even more.
Clearly what should also be evident is that the actions taken by several MENA
governments to head off feared Arab uprisings resulting from the youth unemployment
problems by raising public sector wage rates and creating relatively unproductive
government jobs can only be counterproductive to training and private sector development
(Tzannatos, 2013).
Needless to say, the issues under investigation in this study are sufficiently important
and the apparent training gap between MENA and Non-MENA countries sufficiently
large as to demand further research. Among the needs are (1) Enterprise Surveys of
additional MENA countries with all the relevant questions included, (2) larger within-
country samples to facilitate separate investigations by industry, (3) adding a question
asking the respondent firms to distinguish between hiring and firing rules as obstacles
to business, and (4) constructing panels of firms from successive surveys, especially in
those cases in which either labor regulations or their enforcement may have changed
over time.
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1In MENA countries, the youth unemployment rate is typically several times as high
as the overall unemployment rate (Bardak et al. 2006, Fig. 1.9).
2This characteristic is perhaps somewhat less known than the first three but has been
widely acknowledged among those familiar with the skill gap between that which firms
want and what job entrants possess. Part of the reason that it is less well known is that
because firms often identify a number of obstacles as serious barriers to their business,
according to the summarized data by region on the Enterprise Survey website, only
5.1% of MENA firms currently rate this lack of skills to be the most serious barrier
to their business.
3While such surveys have also been conducted for Algeria 2002, Jordan 2006,
Morocco 2007 and West Bank and Gaza 2006, unfortunately they did not include the
relevant questions on training.
4Unfortunately, however, the question about competition from the informal sector
was asked very differently outside of the MENA region and is deemed unsuitable as a
proxy for regulatory enforcement.
5Although tests for the normality of the residuals may not be as meaningful for Probit
models as for linear models, the application of the Shapiro-Francia Test for normality
suggests that, in general, the hypothesis of normality should not be rejected for the
MENA sample in Tables 4 and 5 (Shapiro and Francia, 1972).
6This finding is quite consistent with the more qualitative assertions of the policy
studies undertaken in the MENA region cited in Section 2 above.
7For example, this is easiest to see in column (2) of Table 4 where raising this from 0
to 1 would increase the likelihood of training by over 3%.
8For example, making use of the results in column (2) of Table 4, raising the value of
Obstacle Informal Low from 0 to 1 would have the effect of raising the probability of
training in that firm’s group by 0.0163. If this were also a country with an average level
of IndexF, i.e., 46, from the relevant coefficients of column (2) of Table 5, the probabil-
ity of training would be increased by 0.0236. Since Obstacle Informal Low is, for rea-
sons given above, our preferred enforcement proxy, this is our preferred estimate of the
effect that could be expected of an increase in enforcement. Yet, if either of alternative
measures (Mean Management Time or Log (Inspections Tax) were used, as in columns
(4) and (6) of the same table, the results show that the probabilities of training would
be increased by even more.Additional file
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